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Consumer Warranty or Insurance Contract?
A View Towards A Rational State Regulatory Policy
A pervasive and recurrent problem for state officials charged with
regulating insurance is determining which business activities constitute
the sale of insurance under state law. In a recent decision,1 the Court
of Appeals of Arizona held that the sale by the defendant of contracts
extending the manufacturer's warranty on television picture tubes
constituted the sale of insurance. The purpose of this note is to show
that the court's decision, guided almost solely by a definition, overlooked
important policy reasons not to regulate.
The Director of Insurance of Arizona had sought to enjoin de-
fendant Guaranteed Warranty from selling its so-called "warranty
agreement" contracts. Under those contracts, the defendant agreed to
replace picture tubes of televisions purchased from certain stores if
the picture tubes failed as a result of a manufacturing defect. Defendant
conducted its business by establishing dealerships with independent
stores that sold televisions to the consumer. When a consumer pur-
chased a television from such a store, the store would offer the consumer
one of the defendant's warranty agreements along with the television.
By paying a fixed amount' in addition to the purchase price, the con-
sumer could acquire one of the defendant's warranty agreements, which
took effect only after the manufacturer's warranty on the picture tube
expired.'
These facts raise two substantial questions. First, do the defendant's
contracts constitute warranty agreements, which would be exempt from
regulation, or insurance policies within the ambit of regulation ?4 Sec-
ond, if the contracts are insurance policies, on what basis should courts
distinguish these "insurance policies" from warranties given by manu-
1 Guaranteed Warranty Corp. v. State ex rel. Humphrey, 23 Ariz. App. 327, 533
P.2d 87 (1975).2 The warranties are priced at $29.95 for a color tube and $14.95 for a black and
white tube. 23 Ariz. App. at 329, 533 P.2d at 89. They extend coverage to five years and
three years, respectively. Phoenix Gazette, Oct. 14, 1969, at 60.
323 Ariz. App. at 329, 533 P.2d at 89.
4See ARi. Rnv. STAT. §20-206 (A) (1975) which provides that "Enlo person
shall act as an insurer and no insurer shall transact insurance in this state except as
authorized by a subsisting authority granted to it by the director [of insurance] .... "
If the defendant were selling insurance, it would have to be licensed by the State of
Arizona before any more of its policies could be sold to television buyers. See ArIz. REv.
STAT. §§20-215, 216 (1975).
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facturers in order to avoid subjecting all such warranties to the insur-
ance laws?
In resolving these issues, the Court of Appeals generally defined
"insurance" as "a contract whereby one undertakes to indemnify another
or to pay a specified amount upon determinable contingencies."5 It fur-
ther enumerated the following five elements of an insurance contract:
1. An insurable interest
2. A risk of loss
3. An assumption of the risk by the insurer
4. A general scheme to distribute the loss among the larger group of
persons bearing similar risks
5. The payment of a premium for assumption of the risk.6
The Court also relied upon the assumption that under the Uniform
Commercial Code only a seller of goods can give a warranty.T Noting
that the defendant was not the seller of the televisions and that the
warranty agreements contained the elements characteristic of an insur-
ance contract, the Court of Appeals held that the defendant was an
insurer within the regulatory statute.8 In reaching its decision, there-
5 23 Ariz. App. at 330, 533 P.2d at 90, citing ARIz. REv. STAT. § 20-103 (1975).
6 Id. at 330, 533 P.2d at 90. See 1973 ARiz. Op. Arr' Y GEN. 12; 1957 ARiz. Op'. ATr'Y
GEN. 147. The opinions of the Attorneys General analyze prearranged funeral plans and
certain automobile warranty contracts by using the Guaranteed Warranty approach of
noting five elements of an insurance contract in addition to a definition.
7 See 23 Ariz. App. at 330, 533 P.2d at 90. See also ARiz. Rnv. STAT. § 44-2330
(1967), UNIroRm COMMMRCAL CODE § 2-313 which provides:
A. Express warranties by the seller are created as follows:
1. Any afflirmation of fact or promise made by the seller to the buyer which
relates to the goods and becomes part of the basis of the bargain creates an
express warranty that the goods shall conform to the affirmation or promise.
2. Any description of the goods which is made part of the basis of the bargain
creates an express warranty that the goods shall conform to the description.
3. Any sample or model which is made part of the basis of the bargain creates
an express warranty that the whole of the goods shall conform to the sample
or model.
ARiz. REv. STAT. § 44-2331 (1967), UNoRm COMaaRCIA. CODE § 2-314 which provides:
A. Unless excluded or modified . . . , a warranty that the goods shall be
merchantable is implied in a contract for their sale if the seller is a merchant
with respect to goods of that kind. Under this section the service for value of
food or drink to be consumed either on the premises or elsewhere is a sale.
ARiz. REv. STAT. § 44-2332 (1967), UNIToRm Comma=acs CODE § 2-314 which provides:
Where the seller at the time of contracting has reason to know any particular
purpose for which the goods are required and that the buyer is relying on the
seller's skill or judgment to select or furnish suitable goods, there is unless excluded
or modified . . .an implied warranty that the goods shall be fit for such purpose.
8 See ARiz. REv. STAT. §§20-103, -206, -256 (1975). §20-256 defines property
insurance as
insurance on real or personal property of every kind and interest therein, against
loss or damage from any or all hazard or cause, and against loss consequential
upon such loss or damage, other than noncontractual legal liability for any such
loss or damage. Property insurance shall also include miscellaneous insurance ...
ApiZ, REV. STAT. § 20-252(11) (1975) states that miscellaneous insurance is
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fore, the court in Guaranteed Warranty relied principally upon a defini-
tion of insurance to resolve the problem of whether the defendant was
properly subject to insurance regulation.
This note will demonstrate that such a definitional approach is
inappropriate since it fails to take into account the policies relevant
to insurance regulation. Further, this note will show that the court did
not properly draw the necessary distinction between the sale of insur-
ance and the warranty given by the manufacturer of a product under
the Uniform Commercial Code.'
PUBLIC POLICY AND THE IMPOSITION OF REGULATION
The problem underlying the Guaranteed Warranty case is that the
court's reliance upon definitional elements of insurance as the sole guide
to the imposition of regulation may overlook compelling policy reasons
not to regulate a given business.' 0 Definitions such as that used by the
Guaranteed Warranty court have been called "so broad and general as
to be virtually useless as guides to determining applicability of the
regulatory system in a disputed setting."" The policies of regulation
insurance against any other kind of loss, damage or liability properly a subject
of insurance and not within any other kind of insurance as defined in this title,
if such insurance is not disapproved by the director as being contrary to law or
public policy.
Insurance in Arizona is regulated by the state's Department of Insurance under the
authority of Title 20 of Arizona Revised Statutes. Any decision to regulate brings into
play many of the sections of Title 20. See note 45 infra & text accompanying.
9 See notes 7 supra, 60 infra & text accompanying.
10 See, J. ATnEARN, Riss AN INSURANCE 613 (2d ed. 1969) ; C. ELLIOTT & E. VAUcHAN,
FUNDAmNTALS OF RISK AND INsURANcE 11 (1972); R. KETON, BASIC TEXT oN INSUR-
ANcE LAW 547, §8.2(b) (1971); A. H. MowBRAY, R. BLANCEARD & C. WILLIAe, S, JR.,
INSURANcE 517-522 (6th ed. 1969); E.W. PATTERSON, ESSENTIALS OF INSURANCE LAW
I (2d ed. 1957); R. RIECEL, J. ]MLLER & C. WIL=A s, JR., INSURANCE PRINCIPLES AND
PRACnCES: PROP.RTY AND LiALrr 61 (6th ed. 1976); Stewart, The Social Responsibility
of Insurance Regulation, in INsuAcE, GovERNMENT, AND SOCIAL Porac 33 (Kimball
and Denenberg eds. 1969); Stewart, Ritual and Reality in Insurance Regulation, in id.
at 22; Hellner, The Scope of Insurance Regulation: What is Insurance for Purposes of
Regulation?, 12 Am. J. Com'. L. 494 (1963) [hereinafter cited as The Scope of Insurance
Regulation]; Huff, Development of Public Policy from the Viewpoint of a State Insurance
Regulator, 1975 INs. LJ. 393; Kimball, The Purpose of Insurance Regulation: A Pre-
liminary Inquiry in the Theory of Insurance Law, 45 MINN. L. Rnv. 471, 517 (1961).
"R. KEETON, supra note 10, § 8.2(a), at 543 (1971). Keeton cites the following
California definition of insurance as an example of a "virtually useless!' statutory guide
to regulation: "Insurance is a contract whereby one undertakes to indemnify another
against loss, damage, or liability arising from a contingent or unknown event." Id. § 8.2(a),
at 543, n. 1, citing WEST CAmL. INS. CODE § 22 (West 1955). Cf. text at note S supra.
Unfortunately such definitions do not adequately differentiate insurance from warranties
for purposes of imposing regulation. See notes 53-56 infra & text accompanying. Some
states have attempted to codify more sophisticated definitions of insurance. Indiana's
definition states that
'Insurance' means a contract of insurance or an agreement by which one party,
for a consideration, promises to pay money or its equivalent or to do an act
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simply cannot be expressed in a short definition of insurance.12
The insurance industry is subject to substantially greater regula-
tion and control than virtually all other forms of business enterprise.13
One of the most important reasons for such control is that "the whole
value of the promise sold to the public by insurers lies in future per-
formance."14 The obligation of the insurer to the insured is aleatory:
the insurer is only potentially liable on its promise since the maturation
of that promise is based on a fortuitous event. 5 This aleatory element
of an insurance contract makes it difficult for the consumer to value
his bargain. He is constrained to pay premiums for the insurer's cover-
age against a risk which may never mature. Regulation is thought neces-
sary to prevent an insurer from taking unfair advantage of the con-
sumer, who has far less knowledge and information to assess risks
than does the insurer with whom he deals.' 6
valuable to the insured upon the destruction, loss or injury of something in which
the other party has a pecuniary interest, or in consideration of a price paid,
adequate to the risk, becomes security to the other against loss by certain specified
risks; to grant indemnity or security against loss for a consideration.
IND. CODE ANN. § 27-1-2-3 (a) (Burns 1975).
Another problem with definitions is that their sheer number casts considerable doubt
upon the validity of any of them. See The Scope of Insurance Regulation, supra note 10,
at 529. Statutes can easily contain very different elements ostensibly "characteristic" of
insurance. If a definition stated that insurance was a promise by the insurer to pay money
to the insured upon the happening of a fortuitous event, a promise to provide services
or even replacement parts could not be regulated as insurance.2 See The Scope of Insurance Regulation, supra note 10, at 528; Huff, supra note
10, at 393.
13 See C. ELLIOTT & E. VAUGHAN, supra note 10, at 116-122; ARH. MowaRAY, R.
BLANCHARD & C. WILLIAMS, JR., supra note 10, at 157; W.R. VANCE, HANDBOOK ON THE
LAW OF INSURANCE 36 (3rd ed. 1951). The forms of regulation are many: controls over-
the structure of the insurance organization, capital and surplus requirements, rate regula-
tion, reserve requirements, provisions for examinations, investment controls, and so on.
14 A.H. MOWBRAY, R. BLANCHARD & C. WILIAMs, JR., supra note 10, at 517.
15 1 R. ANDERSON, COUCH: CYCrOPEDiA OF INSURANCE LAW, § 1:5 (2d ed. 1959);
E.W. PATTERSON, supra note 10, at 2.
1611e inequality between the consumer of insurance and the insurer is often said to
present a problem of bargaining power. Whether the inequality stems from market struc-
ture or consumer ignorance, however, is not always clear. See E.W. PATTERSON, supra
note 10, at 3; Kimball, supra note 10, at 523. See also Kessler, Contracts of Adhesion-
Some Thoughts About Freedom of Contract, 43 CoLum. L. REv. 629 (1943); Patterson,
The Delivery of a Life-Insurance Policy, 33 HARv. L. Rav. 198, 222 (1919); Note, The
Adhesion Contract of Insurance, 5 SANTA CLARA LAw. 60 (1964).
Professor Kimball argues that insurance has objective and subjective functions in
social life. Kimball, supra note 10, at 478. It both reimburses the insured who has
suffered a loss and gives that insured confidence that he will be reimbursed. Regulation
affects both of these functions of insurance, and has particular effect upon the internal
working of the insurance industry. While regulation promises the insured that his insurer
is solvent, it also aims at the achievement of aequum et bonum, which is equity, fairness,
reasonableness, and efficiency in the conduct of the industry. As Kimball points out, aequum
et bonum means that "the cost of insurance should correspond to its value or, more
generally, that the insurer should treat the whole body of policyholders in a reasonable
and fair manner." Kimball, id., at 490. Although Kimball acknowledges the propriety of
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If the contractual obligation of the insurer matures, the value
of the insurer's promise to the insured is only as great as the financial
stability of the insurer.17 A second reason for regulating the insurance
business, therefore, is to see that an insurance company's investments
yield an adequate income and that the company will be financially
capable of satisfying its matured obligations.1" To achieve this goal,
insurance companies have often been required to invest in bonds and
mortgages, both of which are reliable long-term investments. 19
A third objective of regulation is the state's interest in seeing that
insurers have adequate technical knowledge and skill to conduct a busi-
ness which has become increasingly complex and socially important.
Since the public lacks the knowledge necessary to evaluate insurance
methods and contracts, the state's requirement that insurers have tech-
nical knowledge and skill encourages the public to purchase protection
against the risks of everyday life."0 An incidental benefit of this objec-
tive of regulation is protection for the consuming public against fraud
or incompetence ;21 an insurer supervised in the conduct of its business
using legal controls to assure consumers of insurer solvency, he states that "there is more
disposition to question interference by the law on behalf of ...aequum et bonum," which
depends to some extent upon policyholders' subjective views of their treatment by an
insurer and not upon an objective fact like solvency, which is more easily amenable to
regulation. Kimball, id., at 486.
'
T See, H. DENENBERG, R. ErrERs, J. MELoNE & R. ZELTON, Rrsyn AND INSuRAxcE
618 (2d ed. 1974) [hereinafter cited as H. DENENBERG, et al.]; A.H. MowBRAY, R. BrA-
cHRD & C. W=mr s, JR., supra note 10, at 432; Kimball, supra note 10, at 518.
1SSee H. DENENBERG, et al, supra note 17, at 649; Kimball and Denenberg, The
Regulation of Investments: A Wisconsin Viewpoint, in INSURANCE, GovERNENxT, Am
SocaL PoLIcY, supra note 10, at 126; Mayerson, Ensuring the Solvency of Property and
Liability Insurance Companies, in id. at 146.
19ARIz. REv. STAT. § 20-532, -536 to -538, -553 to -555 (1975); Kimball, supra
note 10, at 518.
The insurance codes of the states thoroughly regulate the investments which insurance
companies are permitted to have. See, e.g., ARiz. REv. STAT. § 20-531 to -559 (1975); CAL.
INs. CODE §§ 1170-1182 (West 1972); CoLo. Rav. STAT. §§ 10-3-215 to -230 (1973); FLA.
STAT. §§ 625.0100-.0139 (1969); ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 73, §§ 736-737.22(a); IND. CODE ANN.
§§ 27-1-12-2, -13-3, -2-6-1 (Burns 1975); IOWA CODE § 515.35 (1949); Mscnu. CoMzP. LAws
ANN. §§500.900-.960 (1967); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§17:2-1, 2-9.4 (West 1963); N.Y. INS.
LAw § 81 (McKinney 1966); Omo Rnv. CODE ANr. §§ 3925.05, -.06 (Page 1971); TEx.
REv. Civ. STAT. art. 2.10 (Vernon 1963); Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 620.01 to .32 (Spec. Pamphlet
1975).2 0See A.H. MOWBRAY, R. BLAcHARD & C. WimmkAs, JR., supra note 10, at 520;
Mayerson, supra note 18, states that "the major purpose of insurance is to turn uncertainty
into certainty and thus provide a sense of security for the policyholder." Id. at 146. See
also Kimball, supra note 10, who suggests that the regulation of insurer solvency also has
the beneficial effects of building public confidence and of encouraging the public to buy
insurance. Id. at 478.
2 1 See H. DENENBERO, et al., supra note 17, at 619:
[A]nother emerging goal of supervision ... is aimed at competence. For example,
at one time a person could obtain an agent's license merely by paying a fee, and
all an agent needed was a rate-book and a lot of "gall." Today .. . increasing
attention is being placed on agents' qualifications, education, and overall compe-
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and compelled by the state to be competent is less likely to defraud
the consumer.
Perhaps Professor Robert Keeton has best summarized the three
principal objectives of insurance regulation.2 First, because statutes
and judicial doctrines control the marketing practices of insurance com-
panies, regulation prevents overreaching by insurers. Second, regulation
assures the consumer of the solvency of his insurer. Most important,
this aspect of regulation protects the insured from the adverse conse-
quences of the insurer's imprudent management of its investments and
funds. Third, regulation is aimed at ensuring that premium rates and
rating classifications are reasonable and fair. The effort here is to see
that, among other things, a proportionate allocation among policy-
holders of premium charges is effected.23
The Inadequacy of the Judicially Created "Tests"
Courts have attempted in numerous ways to overcome the limita-
tions of definitions and to integrate policy considerations into their
decisions on whether a business should be within a state's regulatory
scheme. These attempts have assumed the form of "tests," which are
relied upon to reach more nearly correct decisions on regulation than
are possible by using a definition alone.24
The simplest test of all would be for a court to look only at the
term used in the contract. It would then follow that whatever was
termed an insurance contract would subject the "insurer" to state regu-
lation, whereas whatever was not termed an insurance contract would
not be regulated by the state.25 Applied to the Guaranteed Warranty
tence; there is even a significant movement toward professionalization in the sale
of insurance.
But see R. DriKS & L. GRoss, THE GREAT WALL STREET ScANDAL 5 (1974) wherein, when
speaking of the recent insurance scandal which they call "The All-American Fraud," the
authors question the effectiveness of state regulation in controlling fraud by asking rhe-
torically: "And where were the various state insurance departments, whose responsibility
it was to certify the activities of the Equity Funding Life Insurance Company," which
perpetrated the fraud in question; J. KwiTNr, THE FOUNTAIN PEN CONSPIRACY 151
(1973). Cf. note 47 infra & text accompanying.22 R. KEETON, supra note 10, at 554.
23Id.
2 4 See The Scope of Insurance Regulation, supra note 10, at 500; Note, Insurance-
Burial Associations-Definition of Insurance, 15 N.C.L. REV. 417 (1937).
25 But see State v. Spalding, 166 Minn. 167, 170, 207 N.W. 317, 318 (1926) (It is
immaterial whether or not the contract on its face purports to be one of insurance. The
courts will look behind the terminology to ascertain what the parties intended to ac-
complish.); Mein v. United States Car Testing Co., 115 Ohio App. 145, 149, 184 N.E.2d
489, 493 (1961) (Name by which contract is called does not determine whether it is
warranty or insurance); Richardson v. Railway Exp. Agency, 258 Or. 170, 181, 482 P.2d
176, 181 (1971) (Character of contract of insurance cannot be concealed by use or absence
of word "insurance". .. ).
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case, this test would obviously result in nonregulation of Guaranteed
Warranty since the company was selling "warranty" and not 'insur-
ance" contracts. The principal shortcoming of this test, of course, is
that its application would open the door to widespread evasion of the
state regulatory system.2"
A second suggested guide to regulation is the purpose-of-the-con-
tract test. Under this test, if the obligation of the promisor is merely
incident to some larger purpose of the contract, then the contract would
not be deemed insurance. In other words, if the principal purpose of a
contract is to indemnify the promisee, a contract of insurance is pres-
ent.27 The court in Guaranteed Warranty had to confront the issue of
defendant's status as an indemnifier,28 although it apparently assumed
that indemnification could not be the purpose of the warranty contract.
This assumption is unsupported, however, because both warranties and
insurance (property insurance in particular) share elements of indemnifi-
cation.29 If the purpose-of-the-contract test were properly applied, a
great many warranty contracts would be subject to insurance regulation.
But the test is too broad and would lead to regulation of such contracts
in many instances where policy considerations dictate otherwise.
Another touchstone of regulation is the "control" test, which
states that insurance covers the occurrence of a risk substantially be-
yond the control of any party to the contract.8 0 Under this test, every
26 The Scope of Insurance Regulation, supra note 10, at 500. See N.Y. INs. LAw
§41(3)(e) (McKinney Supp. 1975) where it is stated that:
The term "doing an insurance business" . . . shall be deemed to include . . .
(e) the doing or proposing to do any business . . . in a manner designed to
evade the provisions of this chapter.
27 The Scope of Insurance Regulation, suPra note 10, at 502; Note, Insurance-Burial
Associations-Definition of Insurance, 15 N.C.L. Rav. 417, 419 (1937). For a codified version
of the purpose-of-the-contract test see N.Y. INs. LAW § 41(3) (b) (McKinney Supp. 1975).2 8 See notes 5 supra, 49-52 infra & text accompanying.
2 9 See, e.g., Metropolitan Coal Co. v. Howard, 155 F.2d 780, 784 (2d Cir. 1946);
Epmeier v. United States, 199 F.2d 508, 509-10 (7th Cir. 1952); Candell v. United States,
189 F.2d 442, 444 (10th Cir. 1951); Hoover v. Nielson, 20 Ariz. App. 130, 133, 510 P.2d
760, 763 (1973); Congdon v. Oneida County Grange Co-op. Fire Ins. Co., 203 Misc. 98,
99, 114 N.Y.S.2d 167, 169 (Sup. CL 1952); Perfecting Serv. Co. v. Product Dev. & Sales
Co., 261 N.C. 660, 669, 136 S.E.2d 56, 63 (1964); Barmeier v. Oregon Physicians' Serv.,
194 Or. 659, 669, 243 P.2d 1053, 1058 (1952); Board of Ins. Comm'rs v. Kansas City
Title Ins. Co., 217 S.W.2d 695, 697 (Tex. Civ. App. 1949); Whiddon v. General Mills,
Inc., 347 S.W.2d 7, 10 (Tex. Civ. App. 1961); Dittman v. Nagel, 43 Wis. 155, 160, 168
N.W.2d 190, 193 (1969); 1 R. ANEnsoN, Coucia: CYCLOPEDIA OF INsuRANCE LAW §§ 1.2,
1.5 (2d ed. 1959).8
oThe Scope of Insurance Regulation, supra note 10, at 500; Note, Insurance-Burial
Assodations-Definition of Insurance, 15 N.C.L. Ray. 417, 418 (1937). See N.Y. INs. LAW
§ 41(1) (McKinney 1966) where the control test has been codified as part of the definition
of insurance:
The term "insurance contract" .. . shall be deemed to include any agreement ...
whereby one party . . . is obligated to confer benefit of pecuniary value upon
another party . . . depending upon the happening of a fortuitous event . . .
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warranty embedded in a sales transaction and covering hazards other
than defects in the article sold, for which a warrantor is properly
responsible, would be subject to regulation as insurance.31
The control test seems . . . particularly intended for distinguishing
legitimate warranties on goods sold, which relate to the quality of
the goods and thus to events under the control of the seller, from
insurance attached to the sale of goods, which concerns events
which are substantially outside the control of the seller.3 2
Applied to the facts of Guaranteed Warranty, the control test results
in regulation. Although the picture tubes warranted were in the article
sold and the warranty related to the quality of the televisions, dearly
neither the retail seller3 3 nor Guaranteed Warranty had any control
whatsoever over the risk that the picture tubes were defective. How-
ever, since few retail sellers of standardized products or manufacturers
of products with standardized parts have any direct control over product
quality,34 the control test leads to regulation in almost every case. The
A fortuitous event is any occurrence or failure to occur which is, or is assumed
by the parties to be, to a substantial extent beyond the control of either party.
31See Anstine v. Lake Darling Ranch, 233 N.W.2d 723, 729 n.8 (Minn. 1975);
Ollendorff Watch Co. v. Pink, 279 N.Y. 32, 36, 17 N.E.2d 676, 677 (1938); State ex rd.
Duffy v. Western Auto Supply Co., 134 Ohio St. 163, 170, 16 N.E.2d 256, 259 (1938);
State ex rel. Herbert v. Standard Oil Co., 138 Ohio St. 376, 381-82, 35 N.E.2d 437, 441
(1941); The Scope of Insurance Regulation, supra note 10, at 501.
Noting that "it is essential that the distinction between warranty and insurance be
dearly stated," the court in the Duffy case asserted that
a warranty promises indemnity against defects in the article sold, while insurance
indemnifies against loss or damage resulting from perils outside of and unrelated
to defects in the article itself.
134 Ohio St. at 170, N.E.2d at 259.
See also Comment, When Contracts for Contingent Performance of Acts Other Than
Payment of Money Constitute Insurance, 36 MacH. L. Rzv. 311 (1937):
The use of the warranty as a device to increase sales is often confused with the
contract of insurance. The warranty promises indemnity against defects in the
article sold, while the insurance contract protects against loss from perils other
than a defect in the article itself. Although often there are difficulties in ascertaining
the true nature of the contract, the distinction should be preserved. Each serves
a real purpose in modern economic life. But the function of insurance is so
important that regulation is necessary to protect the general public from fraudulent
insurance schemes.
Id. at 315 (citations omitted).
82 The Scope of Insurance Regulation, supra note 10, at 500-01.
83 The retail seller of the televisions did not give an express warranty like the de-
fendant's; however, it did give the implied warranty of merchantability and, arguably,
the warranty of fitness for a particular purpose under the Arizona Uniform Commercial
Code. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. §§ 44-2331, -2332 (1975), UNiFoRm COmmRCrAL CODE §§ 2-314,
-315.
34 The Scope of Insurance Regulation, supra note 10, at 501.
A retail seller arguably has no direct control over the quality of a product if he
decides to adopt the manufacturer's warranty when he sells to the consumer. There is
no legal obstacle to any seller's adopting the manufacturer's warranty as his own. See
e.g., Courtesy Ford Sales, Inc. v. Farrior, 298 So. 2d 26, 31 (Ala. Civ. App. 1974); Scovil
v. Chilcoat, 424 P.2d 87 (Okla. 1967); Cochran v. McDonald, 23 Wash. 2d 348, 351, 161
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consequences of applying the control test are far-reaching; virtually
every seller guaranteeing standardized goods or goods with standardized
parts could be classified as an insurer for purposes of state regulation.
The Policy-Oriented Approach
The tests discussed so far fail to integrate the policies underlying
insurance regulation into judicial decisions whether to impose regulation
in a particular case. An approach which might prove more successful
would be to consider whether a particular business operation presents
to the public those dangers which insurance regulation is designed to
prevent: insolvency, lack of insurer competence, unfair premiums, fraud,
and so on. 5 The definitional or test approach and a policy-oriented
approach have been contrasted by Professor Hellner in these terms:
Instead of asking whether there is an assumption and distribution of
risks, we should ask whether there is a need for a complicated tech-
nique which calls for a special skill. Instead of asking whether the
promisee gives any special consideration for the promise, corresponding
to a premium, we have the question of whether the value of the promise
is difficult to estimate. Instead of asking whether the risk attaches to
a fortuitous event, we should rather ask whether there is a need to
collect and maintain special funds. Furthermore, we should ask
whether there is any need for protection against fraud and for ensur-
ing fair and equal treatment of the promises, and whether the promise
has particular social importance.8 6
A decision to regulate a business like Guaranteed Warranty should be
premised upon policy factors such as these as well as upon an apprecia-
tion of the purposes underlying insurance regulation.3 T
P.2d 305, 306 (1945). However, any retail seller adopting a manufacturer's warranty could
be classified as an insurer under the control test.
The basic problem with the control test may be that the meaning of "control" is
either (a) impossible to define or (b) too expansive. On one view, a retailer or manu-
facturer can control the quality of its product by buying only from high quality manu-
facturers or sellers of standardized parts. Retailers or manufacturers can also control
product quality by furnishing specifications for products which they order. These forms
of control impugn the reasonableness of using the control test as a regulatory guide; for
if some control, be it direct or indirect, exists in all cases, then the test cannot differ-
entiate one case from another.
35 Note, Insurance-Burial Associations-Definition of Insurance, 15 N.C.L. REv. 417,
420 (1937).
86 The Scope of Insurance Regulation, supra note 10, at 533.
37 Such factors have influenced decisions in litigation on whether burial contracts
should be regulated as insurance. See, e.g., Benevolent Burial Ass'n v. Harrison, 181 Ga.
230, 181 S.E. 829 (1935); Messerli v. Monarch Memory Gardens, Inc., 88 Idaho 88, 397
P.2d 34 (1964); State ex rel. Londerholm v. Anderson, 195 Kan. 649, 408 P.2d 864 (1965);
Oaklahoma Southwestern Burial Ass'n v. State ex rel. Read, 135 Okla. 151, 274 P. 642
(1928); State ex rel. Long v. Mynatt, 207 Tenn. 319, 339 S.W.2d 26 (1960). See also
Memorial Gardens Ass'n v. Smith, 16 Ill. 2d 116, 156 N.E.2d 587 (1959); Robbins v.
Hennessey, 86 Ohio St. 181, 99 N.E. 319 (1912); Cosmopolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Northing-
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THE POLICY-ORIENTED APPROACH AND THE GUARANTEED
WARRANTY CASE
If the facts of Guaranteed Warranty are examined under the
policy-oriented approach, the result reached by the court seems ques-
tionable. Because the policy-oriented approach imposes regulation only
in those cases presenting the evils which insurance regulatory statutes
are intended to eliminate, it often will produce a result different from
the definitional approach of Guaranteed Warranty.
ton, 201 Tenn. 541, 300 S.W.2d 911 (1957). This litigation focuses on whether an obligor
who promises to furnish burial or funeral services and materials upon the death of the
obligee is conducting an insurance business within the intendment of the state's insurance
laws. Regulation in these cases has been upheld on the ground that regulatory statutes
are reasonable in light of the protection they provide for the public health and safety.
See, e.g., Cosmopolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Northington, 201 Tenn. 541, 554, 300 S.W.2d 911,
916 (1957).
Much of the fear about allowing burial contracts to go unregulated stems from the
fact that the possibility of fraud is substantial. Annot., 68 A.L.R.2d 1251 (1959); 22 Am.
JuR. 2d, Dead Bodies § 3 (1965). See Comment, When Contracts for Contingent Perform-
ance of Acts Other Than Payment of Money Constitute Insurance, 36 MICH. L. REv. 311,
313, 316 (1937). The consumer simply has no way of knowing whether his payments
on a burial contract are fair in view of the benefits he is to receive. This is especially
the case with so-called burial associations, which are often organized by undertakers
who then contract with the association to provide sundry burial products and services.
See Note, Insurance-Burial Associations-Definition of Insurance, 15 N.C.L. Rav. 417
(1937); Note, The Law of Burial Insurance, 5 VAND. L. Rav. 800, 803 (1952). See gem-
erally Sher, Funeral Prearrangement: Mitigating the Undertaker's Bargaining Advantage,
15 STAN. L. REV. 415 (1963). Courts also seem to suspect that burial contracts are entered
into by persons who are most easily duped or defrauded by the promisor. It is, for
example, more likely that low-income consumers will enter into burial contracts. Note,
The Law of Burial Insurance, 5 VAIn. L. Rav. 800, 802 (1952). Unable to afford the
considerable expense of an unexpected funeral, a low-income consumer can often pay the
small premiums commonly required over a long period as part of a burial plan. A final
suspicion about burial contracts is that a surviving beneficiary under a burial contract
is invariably under emotional strain as a result of a death. See Metropolitan Funeral Sys.
Ass'n v. Forbes, 331 Mich. 185, 190, 49 N.W.2d 131, 133 (1951); Sher, Funeral Prearrange-
ment: Mitigating the Undertaker's Bargaining Advantage, 15 STAN-. L. REv. 415, 423, 448
(1963). Thus, the beneficiary can more easily be imposed upon to pay large additional
amounts for a more elaborate funeral than was provided for in the contract. Given the
vulnerability of the beneficiary to exploitation in such circumstances, courts do not hesitate
to impose regulation.
Generally, a court responsive to the position of a consumer who has entered into a
burial contract has little problem in finding elements of insurance in the burial contract.
See 1973 Aniz. Op. Arr'y. GEN. at 12. Since the contract is determinable upon death,
involves an assumption of risk, and has an aleatory element, the contracts can coincide
with a definition of insurance. See, e.g., State ex rel. Reece v. Stout, 17 Tenn. App. 10, 12,
65 S.W.2d 827, 829 (1933); Garrett v. Forest Lawn Memorial Gardens, Inc., 505 S.W.2d
705, 707 (Tenn. 1974). Further, since the burial contractor needs funds on hand to pro-
vide its promised products or services upon death, at least one important purpose for
regulation is frequently present. See Messerli v. Monarch Memory Gardens, Inc., 88 Idaho
88, 97, 98, 397 P.2d 34, 39, 40 (1964); State ex rel. Long v. Mlynatt, 207 Tenn. 319, 324,
339 S.W.2d 26, 28, 29 (1960). Nevertheless, statutes regulating insurance companies can
be inappropriately applied to some burial arrangements, for the same risks and consider-
ations need not apply to both businesses. A burial contract which requires the promisor
to provide only services presents less need to regulate for the purpose of seeing that the
promisor has large reserves and investments.
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There is no evidence, in the Guaranteed Warranty example, of any
overreaching or unequal bargaining power calling for insurance regula-
tion. There is no reason to suppose that any particular class of
Group health plans have also been a source of considerable litigation on whether
certain associations offering medical plans are insurers within the reach of state insurance
law. Since the insurers' requirements respecting paid-in capital, deposits of securities, and
preservation of funds are very strict, their imposition upon a medical association can be
fatal to a small plan or very burdensome to a large plan. Note, The Legal Problems of
Group Health, 52 HAiv. L. Rav. 809, 814 (1939). On the whole, the cases dealing with
the subject of medical health plans are split, but many of the cases have held that
associations offering such plans are not insurers. Compare Jordan v. Group Health Ass'n,
107 F.2d 239 (D.C. Cir. 1939); California Physicians' Sere. v. Garrison, 28 Cal. 2d 790,
172 P.2d 4 (1946); State ex rel. Fishback v. Universal Serv. Agency, 87 Wash. 413, 151
P. 768 (1915) tWth People ex rel. Roddis v. California Mut Ass'n, 68 Cal. Rptr. 585, 68
Cal. 2d 677, 441 P.2d 97 (1968); Associated Hosp. Serv. v. Mahoney, 161 Me. 391, 213
A.2d 712 (1965); McCarty v. King County Medical Serv. Corp., 26 Wash. 2d 660, 175
P.2d 653 (1946). See New Jersey Ass'n of Independent Ins. Agents v. Hospital Serv. Plan,
128 N.J. Super. 472, 320 A.2d 504 (1974).
An often cited case that declined to regulate is Jordan v. Group Health Ass'n, 107
F.2d 237 (D.C. Cir. 1939). The Superintendent of Insurance of Washington, D.C., brought
a suit against defendant Group Health for conducting an unauthorized insurance business.
Defendant offered a plan whereby medical services would be rendered by independent
practitioners to its members. Members of the plan made regular, limited payments to
receive services and supplies within specified limitations according to their needs. The
physicians and hospitals providing services to members received their compensation solely
from Group Health. On these facts, the District of Columbia Circuit held that defendant's
agreement was not to pay its members the amount of their losses; instead, the court
stated that Group Health agreed only to pay the physicians for services they provided to
members of Group Health. "[I]n an accurate, nontechnical sense, [the physician], rather
than Group Health, is... more nearly analogous to an insurer." Id. at 246. Further, since
Group Health's by-laws provided that
[it should] not be liable to its members ... for any act of omission or commission
on the part of physicians . . . with whom it [contracted] for the rendition of
services... .
it was not deemed an insurer. Id. at 243 n.9.
Speaking of Jordan, one commentator has observed:
Although the arrangement... was well-conceived to minimize and subordinate
the elements of risk transference and distribution through the Association, it is
difficult to escape the conclusion that the decision was influenced by an appraisal
of the arrangement as socially useful and as giving rise to a less urgent need for
public regulation than ordinary insurance arrangements.
KEzON, BASIC TExr oN INsUrA cx LAW, § 8.2(b), at 547 (1971).
That is, Jordan evinces that policy does play an important role in regulatory decision-
making. Inasmuch as a policy-oriented approach allows a court to take account of the
want-satisfying ability of a plan as well as its value to the public before imposing regula-
tion, it has great practical advantages over a definitional approach. See People ex rel. Roddis
v. California Mut. Ass'n, 68 Cal. 2d 677, 682-83, 68 Cal. Rptr. 585, 588-89, 441 P.2d 97,
100-01 (1968) (Any "workable test must be a compromise of two policies:" insuring
adequate financial reserves and encouraging the services which health plans provide the
public). See also West & Co. v. Sykes, 257 Ark. 515 S.W.2d 635 (1974); State ex rel.
Farmer v. Monsanto, 517 S.W.2d 129 (Mo. 1974); 28 ARx. L. R1v. 515 (1975).
Of course, certain medical plans can be brought within the scope of a regulatory
statute if a court relies only upon definitions or looks only for elements characteristic of
insurance. For instance, some cases have turned almost entirely upon the presence or
absence of indemnity in a plan. Maloney v. American Independent Medical & Health Ass'n,
119 Cal App. 2d 319, 325-26, 259 P.2d 503, 506-07 (D. Ct. App. 1953); New Jersey Ass'n
of Independent Ins. Agents v. Hospital Serv. Plan, 128 N.J. Super. 472, 484-86, 320 A.2d
504, 511-12 (1974). The indemnity element has been deemed so substantial as to make
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consumer-low, middle, or high income - purchased Guaranteed
Warranty's agreements, so no apparent need to protect any peculiarly
susceptible class of consumer is present. Nor would it seem that there
was any substantial possibility of fraud since Guaranteed Warranty
had set up a trust fund, with a bank as trustee, to meet its contractual
obligations as they matured.3 However, even assuming that some risk
of fraud did in fact exist, regulation of Guaranteed Warranty as an
insurer does not offer any sure solution. Consumers have little incentive
to complain to regulatory agencies unless such agencies have the power
to award them damages for exposing such abuses as consumer fraud. 9
the plan insurance where, upon the occurrence of a contingency, the plan entails the
payment of money rather than the rendition of a service. Associated Hosp. Serv. v. Mahoney,
161 Me. 391, 407-08, 213 A.2d 712, 721 (1965).
38 Phoenix Gazette, Oct. 8, 1969, at 60; Phoenix Gazette, Oct. 11, 1969, Answer Line
Column.
Defendant Guaranteed Warranty established its trust fund, irrevocable during the
time that any warranty contract remained outstanding and unexpired, on July 3, 1969
with the United Bank of Arizona as trustee. The trust was expressly intended to protect
consumers of defendant's warranties by ensuring a fund out of which payments owed
under matured warranty contracts could be made, in the event that defendant was unable
to meet its outstanding obligations from other funds. The terms of the trust property
section of the trust read as follows:
The COMPANY agrees to transfer, assign and deliver to TRUSTEE, at least
quarter annually, an amount in cash, equal to twenty-five percent (25%) of the
warranty payments collected from the sale of COMPANY'S warranty contracts,
until the aggregate value of the trust fund equals Two Hundred Fifty Thousand
Dollars ($250,000); thereafter, fifteen per cent (15%), until the aggregate value
of the trust fund equals Five Hundred Thousand Dollars ($500,000); and there-
after, ten per cent (10%), until the aggregate value of the trust fund equals One
Million Dollars ($1,000,000.00), at which time no further contributions shall be
made by the COMPANY.
The trustee was not required to verify the amount of contributions to the fund; its
administrative duties and powers were specified in other sections of the trust. [A copy
of defendant's trust agreement is on file with the IND.ANA LAW JouRNAL.
Defendant became a member of the Better Business Bureau in July of 1969.
39See R. PosNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW, § 10.1-10.2 (1973).
In connection with his analysis of the merits of regulation and common-law remedies,
Professor Posner has developed the idea of consumer incentives to resort to the FTC
for redress of fraud. He notes that
The inadequacy of the common law remedy is the usual justification offered for
the Federal Trade Commission's (FTC) program of policing the accuracy of
representations made in advertising, labeling, and other sales materials. But before
the justification is accepted, the possibilities for improving the common law remedy
should be explored. The possibilities are many. Defrauded consumers could be
permitted to obtain their legal fees, plus a penalty as an additional incentive to
sue, in any successful action against the seller. Consumer class actions, which
permit a number of insignificant individual claims to be aggregated into a single
large claim, could be encouraged....
These possibilities seem attractive in part because the commission's record of
performance has not been impressive. We shall not elaborate this well-documented
conclusion here, but we shall suggest some economic reasons for the commission's
problems. One is that consumers have little incentive to invoke the commission's
enforcement machinery. The commission cannot award any damages or penalty to
a defrauded consumer. The threat of a complaint to the commission may sometimes
induce a seller to buy off an angry consumer but once the commission begins pro-
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At all events, the case for regulating Guaranteed Warranty as an
insurer to prevent consumer exploitation or fraud is no stronger than
the case for regulating any warrantor.40
Moreover, the Guaranteed Warranty case does not present a situ-
ation in which consumers are peculiarly unable to value their bargain.
On the contrary, one fixed sum was payable for protection against a
contingency that could easily be understood: the failure of a television
picture tube after the manufacturer's warranty thereon had expired.
Unlike warranties generally available on most consumer goods in which
the warranty is priced as part of the goods, the Guaranteed Warranty
contract is offered to the consumer at a distinct price; the warranty
contract is, therefore, relatively easy to value. Equally important, and
unlike the case of fire or life insurance, no one would feel compelled
to buy one of the defendant's contracts because of the magnitude of
potential loss. In sum, since nothing shows that the market is not
functioning properly, market controls obviate the necessity for regula-
tion. Market processes prevent a warrantor not meeting its promises
from surviving for long in the marketplace.4'
One is also hard pressed to establish that the marketing practices
of the defendant were unreasonable or unfair or that they left the
consumer in an unfavorable bargaining position. Defendant's market-
ing practices simply did not allow it to use high-pressure tactics to
effect sales of its warranty contracts. Further, inasmuch as the con-
sumer could ask the store about the terms of defendant's contracts
before buying and could thereby easily protect himself, state regulation
of defendant to protect the consumer from unreasonable marketing
practices is unnecessary. To justify regulation based upon defendant's
marketing practices could conceivably lead to regulation of the store
ceedings the seller will have no further incentive to come to terms with the con-
sumer; this must limit consumers' interest in filing complaints with the FTC ...
Id. at § 10.2.
401mportant federal warranty regulation recently came into existence with the enact-
ment of the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act. Discussion of the merits and demerits of the
Act has been frequent. See Clark & Davis, Beefing Up Product Warranties: A New Dimen-
sion in Consumer Protection, 23 KAN. L. REv. 567 (1975); Leete, A Look at the Consumer
Warranty Problem-The Federal Solution, 6 U. ToL. L. REv. 351 (1975); Note, The
Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act: Consumer Information and Warranty Regulation, 51 IND.
L.J. 397 (1976); Comment, Magnuson-Moss Act Seeks to Promote Enforceability and
Comprehensibility of Written Warranties, 7 RUTERS CaEmm L.J. 379 (1976); Note,
The Magnuson-Moss Warranty-Federal Trade Commission Improvement Act: Protecting
Consumers Through Product Warranties, 33 WASH. & LEE L. Rnv. 163 (1976).
A pre-enactment discussion of the pros and cons of warranty regulation is contained
in AaiaERicA ENTERPRISE INSITUTE FOR PUSLIC PoLICY RESEARCr, PROPOSALS TO REGULATE
CONSUNER WARRANTIES Am EXPAND =Z PowERS OF Twa. FTC 25-32 (1973).
4 1Lynn, Achieving Effective Warranty Protection-Competition or Regulation, 42
PNN. B.Q. 44, 46 (1970).
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which sold the contracts, a result which would be flagrant overregu-
lation.
Nor does it appear that regulation was necessary to guarantee
that the "insurer" would be competent and technically knowledgeable.
The defendant offered a specialized service and sold narrowly drawn
protection against a readily ascertainable contingency. On these facts,
the necessity for defendant to have the same broad and technical knowl-
edge of insurance methods as, for example, a major life or property
insurer is not apparent. The services offered by the latter are subject
to the supervision of the state's insurance department in part because
they are of enormous social importance. But the television picture
tube warranty does not raise such concerns.
Maintaining insurer solvency is another important factor in a
decision to regulate. State insurance codes specify financial require-
ments which must be satisfied by insurers before starting business.
For instance, certain amounts of capital or surplus are required and
must be maintained before a license to do business as an insurer will
be issued by the state. 2 Deposits of cash and securities often make up
a fund used to pay off consumers in the event that an insurer becomes
insolvent."' These requirements advance the state's interest in building
42 See, e.g., ARIZ. RaV. STAT. § 20-210(A) (1975):
To qualify for authority to transact any one kind of insurance an insurer shall
possess and thereafter maintain paid-in capital stock, if a stock insurer, or surplus,
if a foreign or alien mutual or reciprocal or Lloyd's association insurer, in an
amount not less than as shown by the applicable portion of the following schedule:
Minimum Capital or
Kind of Insurance Surplus Required
Life and/or disability $100,000
Domestic limited stock life and disability 25,000
Property 200,000
Marine and transportation 200,000
Casualty (including vehicle and other casualty lines) 250,000
Vehicle (exclusive of other casualty lines) 200,000
Surety 250,000
Title 250,000
All insurances except life and title 350,000
See also Amz. REV. STAT. § 20-536(A) (1975):
Every insurer shall invest and maintain invested funds to the amount of the
minimum paid-in capital required under this title of a like domestic stock insurer
transacting like kinds of insurance, only in cash and the securities described in the
following sections of this article: [enumerating the following permissible invest-
ments: securities of or guaranteed by the United States, securities of states,
territories, counties, municipalities, school districts, political subdivisions, public
districts or civil divisions thereof, mortgage loans on real estate].
48 See Aaz. RZav. STAT. § 20-213 (1975):
The director shall not issue a certificate of authority to any insurer unless it has
deposited in trust with the state treasurer... cash or securities ... in an amount
not less than the minimum paid-in capital stock, if a stock insurer, or minimum
surplus, if a mutual or reciprocal insurer, required pursuant to this article. . . .
ARui. REV. STAT. § 20-581 (1975):
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public confidence in the insurance industry. The Guaranteed Warranty
court, however, did not consider whether these concerns were relevant
to the case; nor did it consider whether investment controls upon
defendant would serve any particular purpose.
In any event, the financial requirements and security provisions
of the insurance code are grossly disproportionate to the purpose of
protecting warranty consumers. Such provisions are calculated to
assure the ability of a property, vehicle, casualty or other major insurer
to meet its outstanding obligations. The outstanding liability on even
a great number of warranty contracts is by no means comparable to a
normal property insurer's potential liability on merely a few of its
insurance policies,4 which may cover property valued at many thou-
sands of dollars. Nonetheless, although there was no suggestion that
Guaranteed Warranty was unable to meet its outstanding warranty
obligations, it was still found to be an insurer, mandating compliance
with the security provisions of the insurance code and threatening the
existence of its business if those requirements could not be satisfied. 5
The state treasurer shall accept and hold in trust . . . deposits of securities or
funds by insurers as follows:
1. Deposits required for authority to transact insurance in this state.
ARz. REv. STAT. § 20-582 (1975):
Deposits made under the provisions of § 20-581, shall be held for purposes as
follows:
1. When the deposit is required for authority to transact insurance in this state
the deposit shall be held for the protection of all the insurer's policyholders within
the United States.
The deposit in § 20-582 is used for the payment of outstanding claims in the event that
the insurer becomes insolvent. See R. RIEGEL, J. Mna=a & C. WILLIAars, Jpn, INsURANCE
PaRcrpixs AND PAcTcrcs: PROPERTY AND LiABxr " 62 (6th ed. 1976): "All but a few
states have established insolvency funds that can be used to meet losses of claimants and
creditors of an insolvent property and liability insurer." See also Mayerson, Ensuring the
Solvency of Property and Liability Insurance Companies, in INsuRAN cE, GovERN=NT,
AND SocrAL PoLicy, 149, 156 (Kimball and Denenberg eds. 1969).
4"Assuming that defendant had no trust fund; that it was unable to meet claims on
its outstanding warranties from other funds; and that its deposit with the state treasurer
were $200,000, it would seem that defendant would have to sell at least several thousand
of either its $14.95 black and white warranties or its $29.95 color warranties before the
deposit held by the state would be exhausted by outstanding consumer claims. Even among
the more unusual kinds of property insurance-machinery, glass, crop-hail, rain, earthquake,
or livestock-it is rather difficult to imagine several thousand policies which, upon matura-
tion, would fail to exceed the sum of $200,000.
45A company or corporation found to be transacting insurance business generally must
comply immediately with the state insurance code, which will specify different financial and
solvency standards for different classes of insurers. Contrary to general practice, defendant
has not been compelled to comply with the statutory requirements of the Insurance Code.
Instead, it has been permitted to continue its business pending the passage or rejection in
the Arizona Legislature of a proposed amendment to a house bill. This amendment deals
with "extended warranty insurers," and proposes to exempt such insurers from the burden-
some financial requirements of the Insurance Code. In pertinent part, the proposed amend-
ment provides as follows:
A. Every extended warranty insurer shall deposit with the state treasurer
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Not only are the normal policies in favor of state regulation in-
applicable to the Guaranteed Warranty situation, but other relevant
polices militate against regulation. State insurance departments are
commonly understaffed and overworked,4" and regulation in a mar-
and thereafter maintain on deposit for the benefit and protection of any person
purchasing such extended warranty or guaranty in the event of insolvency of the
extended warranty insurer under its contract with such person:
1. A bond in the amount of twenty-five thousand dollars issued by an
insurance company holding a current certificate of authority issued by the Arizona.
director of insurance, or
2. Eligible securities as defined in section 20-583 having the lesser of par
or market value of not less than twenty-five thousand dollars.
B. The Attorney General shall adopt and promulgate rules and regulations to
enforce the provisions of this section.
C. For purposes of this section 'extended warranty insurer' means any business
as otherwise defined by Title 20, Arizona Revised Statutes, which:
1. For a premium charged, not greater than twenty dollars per annum,
nor greater than three-year term, provides a nonrenewable warranty, guaranty or
service contract on radio, television and sound reproduction equipment in addition
to, or as an extension of, any warranty, guaranty or service provided by the manu-
facturer of such equipment.
2. Is not otherwise authorized to transact property or casualty insurance
business in Arizona or any other governmental jurisdiction.
3. Is not owned or controlled in any degree nor to any extent by a
person, persons or business otherwise authoized to transact property and casualty
insurance business in Arizona or any other state or jurisdiction.
4. Has gross Arizona sales not exceeding one hundred thousand dollars
annually.
5. Has maximum contractual contingent liability not exceeding three
hundred thousand dollars in Arizona.
Proposed House Amendments to H.B. 2237 § 41-196.
In the event that this amendment fails to pass, Guaranteed Warranty will be required
to comply with the provisions of the Insurance Code. It conceivably could then have to
maintain and possess the amount of capital funds required of a property insurer and deposit
an equal amount of cash and securities with the state treasureer. Commendably, the amend-
ment at least realistically tailors solvency guarantees to the risk of insolvency presented to
the consumer by a business like defendant's that is just entering the market. In the long
run, however, defendant's trust agreement, which provides that a percentage of each warranty
contract sale goes to the trust, seems the best means to the end of protecting consumers.
See note 38 supra & text accompanying.
46 The Arizona Department of Insurance conforms to the general rule. As of August
12, 1975, the Department had a staff of fifty-three personnel in six basic divisions: adminis-
trative, property and casualty, examination and financial analysis, inspection and com-
pliance, hearing, and licensing. As of January 31, 1976, 1,497 insurance companies held the
Department's certificate of authority and were regulated. Operating on a minimum budget,
the Department had the following appropriations and expenditures during the fiscal year
1974-1975:
Appropriations Expenses Incurred
Salaries $563,700.00 $551,427.27
Employee Related Expenditures 76,700.00 73,075.78
Other Operating Expenditures 130,400.00 129,728.14
Travel-State 5,300.00 2,013.00
Travel-Out of State 3,300.00 1,915.78
Capital Outlay 4,800.00 906.46
Professional & Outside Services 30,000.00 29,828.57
TOTALS $814,200.00 $788,895.00
Amount Reverted to General Fund $ 25,305.00
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ginally justifiable case merely diminishes the state's capacity to regu-
late in'those instances in which regulation is clearly needed. More-
over, state regulation of insurers occasionally is ineffective, a fact
readily seen from-the number of insurers who have nonetheless become
insolvent."- Given the marginal nature of defendant's "insurance"
&e STATE OF ARIZONA, DEPARTMENT OF INSURANCE, 62D ANNUAL REPORT, at 3 (1974-1975).
47 See M. Kaplan, Regulation for Insolvency, 3 FORUM 166 (1968).
The Indiana case of the Underwriters National Assurance Company (UNAC) exemplifies
some of the difficulties encountered by the state and the consumer following a determination
that an insurer has become insolvent. UNAC, with its principal office in Indianapolis, was
organized and incorporated on Feb. 16, 1960 and was granted a certificate of authority on
May 9, 1961. An examination of UNAC made in 1974 by the National Association of In-
surance Commissioners revealed that the company's capital and surplus were depleted and
that further transaction of its business would jeopardize the interests of policyholders and
the public. INm. CODE ANN. § 27-1-3-8 (Burns 1971). As a result, the Indiana Department of
Insurance, as rehabilitator, took control of UNAC for purposes of conducting its business. IND.
CODE ANN. §§ 27-1-4-1, -2 (Burns 1971). Subsequent rehabilitation proceedings mandated
staying litigation by various policyholders against UNAC and determined that the company
should either liquidate its available assets or be reorganized. The Department of Insurance
chose to reorganize UNAC with the goal of eventually offering insurance to new policy-
holders. Making this choice necessitated immediately eliminating the writing of certain
policies, compromising the company's liability on certain existing benefits, and reducing
benefits afforded under disability income policies. Currently, proposed plans for reorganizing
UNAC are under consideration by the Department of Insurance and other concerned
parties. See UNAC Court File, Superior Court of Marion County, Room No. 5, Indian-
apolis, Indiana.
A complex example of ineffective regulation resulting in insolvency recently centered
on a subsidary of the Equity Funding Corporation of America. This example came to the
attention of the public in April of 1973, and has been called "one of the biggest scandals
in the history of the insurance industry." The Wall Street journal, April 2, 1973, at 1,
col. 6. The scandal stemmed from the discovery that some 64,000 insurance polices, with
a face value in excess of two billion dollars, did not really exist. R. Dmzas & L. GRoss,
THE GREAT WALL STREET SCANDAL. 3 (1974). The policies were "bogus business, pulled out
of thin air, put on the books, and then sold for cash, to reinsurers." The Wall Street
Journal, April 2, 1973, at 1, col. 6. After fraudulently selling the bogus insurance policies,
taken out on non-existent policyholders, Equity Funding Life Insurance Company (EFLIC),
the subsidiary, would frequently forge a death certificate and send it to the reinsurer holding
the policy. The unknowing reinsurer, who bore all the risk, would then forward the pro-
ceeds on the "matured" policy to EFLIC, which would have no beneficiary to whom it
needed to pay the policy proceeds. As a result, EPLIC merely kept as profit all the money
it received from the reinsurers.
Although the Illinois Department of Insurance discovered the scandal and responded
by doing a surprise audit on the defrauding insurer, which was incorporated in Illinois and
was audited every three years,
Team after team of auditors [had] come and gone at EFLIC over the past
few years without uncovering [the fraud] . . . .Given the general audit proced-
ures used on an insurance company, [said] one state regulator, it isn't that
surprising that an ingenious, complex plan like EFLIC's could confound [the
auditors]. "We are just going to have to overhaul our methods," he remark[ed].
The Wall Street Journal, April 2, 1973, at 14, col. 3.
This conclusion was reached by other authorities. Business Week stated that the Equity
Funding scandal "casts grave doubts on the way insurance companies are regulated-and
almost equally grave doubts on auditing systems." Busnqnss WEEK, April 14, 1973, at 80,
col. 2. A partner in a top New York accounting firm opined that
the surprising thing about the Equity Funding swindle is not that it happened,
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activity and the need to maximize the effectiveness of state insurance
departments, defendant's business seems to have been of insufficient
social importance to justify regulation.
Apart from the fact that regulation of the defendant was in-
appropriate within the meaning of the insurance code, the court could
as easily have concluded that regulation was unwarranted because it
would prevent the development of a socially desirable industry. En-
suring relative ease of market entry for legitimate enterprises which
satisfy consumer needs is a desirable objective. Regulating an enter-
prise such as that of defendant erects formidable economic barriers to
market entry; the decision in Guaranteed Warranty imposes upon all
such businesses the extraordinary and unwarranted costs of insurance
regulation.4"
but that it does not happen more often. "In a case where a whole bunch of
people, from the chief executive down to the clerks, are in collusion, I'd defy any
auditor to detect fraud."
BusiNEss WEEK, April 14, 1973, at 84, col. 3.
Commenting on the effectiveness of state insurance departments in detecting fraud, the
New York accountant stated that "you might expect them to detect it . . . but I
wouldn't. State commissioners tend to rely on those records a company chooses to offer
them...." Id. Another commentator pessimistically summed up: "In the wake of the
Equity Funding scandal . . . many investors decided that independent auditors, state
examiners and the SEC are not reliable protection against fraud... ." Shepherd, Weighing
the Scandal Factor, BusuNss WEEK, April 14, 1973, at 71, col. 1. Cf. note 21 supra &
text accompanying. See R. DIRxs & L. GRoss, THE GREAT WALL STR SCANDAL (1974);
R. SoBLE & R. DALLos, THE Ih.nossiLE DREAm: THE E Qurr FUNDING STORY (1975).
Interesting problems resulting from ineffective regulation are often created by the
insolvent insurer who wishes to merge his business with a solvent insurance company to
avoid having his outstanding policies become worthless. See SUacoMM'TrEE OF IBM PUBLIC
REGULATION or = BUSINESS oF INSURANCE COMmITTEE oF THE SECTION oF INSURANCE,
NEGLIGENCE AND COMPENSATION LAw OF TH AmuCAN BAR AssocrAnoN, MERGER OF
INsURANCS ComPANIES 4-5 (1966):
To a greater extent than is generally known or appreciated merger is used by
the insurance business to protect the insuring public from losses arising from inept
or profligate management. In order to protect the good reputation of the business,
strong companies sometimes absorb financially impaired competitors through merger,
without expectation of gain.
For a list of insurance companies that have merged or been placed in receivership since
1972, see BEST's INSURANCE REPORTS: LiFr-HEALTH M-12 (70th ed. 1975).
48 In addition to the cost of depositing with the state treasurer an amount of cash and
securities equal to the sum of capital funds required for authority to transact business,
the insurer has other costs to bear. The director of insurance is required to collect in ad-
vance a number of fees. These include $25.00 for filing charter documents, $65.00 for a
certificate of authority, $45.00 for renewal of the certificate of authority, $100.00 for filing
an annual statement, $20.00 for a license, and several other fees. Amiz. REv. STAT.
§ 20-167 (1975). Cf. IND. CODE ANN. § 27-1-3-16 (Burns 1975).
The director of insurance is also empowered to examine the affairs, transactions, accounts,
records, and assets of each authorized insurer as often as he deems such examination ad-
visable. ARIz. REv. STAT. § 20-156(a) (1975). Cf. IND. CODE ANN. § 27-1-3-8 (Burns 1975).
An examination is required of each insurer applying for an initial certificate of authority
to do business. ARIz. Rv. STAT. § 20-156(b) (1975). The insurer bears the cost of the
examiners' travel expenses, reasonable living expenses, and per diem compensation for
making the examination. ARiz. REv. STAT. § 20-159 (1975). Cf. IND. CODE ANN. § 27-1-3-9
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THE WARRANTY-INSURANCE "DISTINCTION"
Even if the policies underlying insurance regulation could justify
the regulation of Guaranteed Warranty, the court's definitional ap-
proach failed to draw a workable distinction between warrantors and
insurers. As such, the court's approach can only be viewed as precedent
for the imposition of insurance regulation on other warrantors, how-
ever socially undesirable this result might be.
The court attempted to justify regulation of Guaranteed Warranty
on the ground that the main characteristic of insurance is indemnifi-
cation. Because one purpose of this distinction was to differentiate
warranties and insurance, the implication was that a warranty does
not indemnify. However, the court appears to have been mistaken,
since a major purpose of both warranties and insurance is indemnifi-
cation.49 To allow defendant's status as an indemnifier to determine
whether the defendant was an insurer or warrantor only obscures the
close relationship between warranties and insurance.50
The difficulties inherent in the court's treatment of the indemnity
problem can be seen in the resolution of a related issue in the case.
This issue centered on the defendant's intention to enlarge its con-
tractual coverage to provide services and labor in the event that a
picture tube warranted by the defendant proved faulty as a. result of
a manufacturing defect.5 ' The defendant argued that once it began to
provide services and labor it would be offering a contingent service
and not merely indemnity and that it would therefore no longer be an
insurer. The court responded by stating that defendant's
enlarged future plan is still to indemnify the purchasers of the con-
tract. Indemnity is the principal object of the contract and the mere
addition of labor does not substantially alter this purpose.
52
Following this logic, however, any agreement to supply all necessary
parts and repairs for a given period of time could be characterized
as insurance subject to state regulation.
(Burns 1975). Further, no one can act as an agent, .broker, or solicitor without a license.
ARiz. REV. STAT. § 20-287 (1975). Cf. IND. CODE ANN. § 27-1-15-3 (Burns 1975). The
required examination of applicants for a license increases costs. Amiz. REV. STAT.
§ 20-292 (1975). Cf. IND. CODE ANN. § 27-1-15-4 (Burns 1975). In Guaranteed Warranty, the
retail store marketing defendant's contracts would be the party bearing the costs of agent's
fees and examinations.
4 9 See note 29 supra & text accompanying.
50 See notes 52-56 infra & text accompanying.
51 Guaranteed Warranty Corp. v. State ex rel. Humphrey, 23 Ariz. App. 327, 330, 533
P.2d 87, 90 (1975).
52 Id. at 331, 533 P.2d at 91.
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The court's attempt to distinguish insurance and warranties by
considering five "elements" of insurance 3 fails also, for similar reasons.
With both property insurance and warranties, the owner of the property
has an insurable interest therein. The risk of loss is normally on the
buyer as the owner of the property. Further, the risk of loss is shifted
to the warrantor or insurer under a warranty contract as well as under
an insurance contract. The same risk in either case is ultimately spread
to a large group of persons who bear similar risks: to either all buyers
of property insurance or all buyers of warranties. In each case a
premium is paid for the service; for insurance the premium is a
separate payment, whereas with warranties the premium is normally
contained in the price of the property purchased.
There are other similarities between insurance and warranties.
Warranties and insurance both entail indemnification, 4 and both in-
volve a promise.55 Both also offer protection against some kind of
contingency.58 The definitional approach, in fact, yields only the essen-
tial similarities between insurance and the common warranty; it offers
no principled basis for preventing the expansion of insurance regulation
to palpably unacceptable limits.
The court's final attempt to distinguish warranties from insurance
was through resort to the Uniform Commercial Code, the warranties
58 See note 6 supra & text accompanying.54 See note 29 supa & text accompanying.
55 Ismert-Hincke Milling Co. v. American Credit Indem. Co., 224 F.2d 538, 542 (8th
Cir. 1955); Schenfeld v. Norton Co., 391 F.2d 420, 422 (10th Cir. 1968); Tri-State Cas.
Ins. Co. v. Loper, 204 F.2d 557, 558 (10th Cir. 1953); Equitable Life Assur. Soc. of United
States v. Pettid, 40 Ariz. 239, 248, 11 P.2d 833, 836 (1932); Peterson v. Hudson Ins. Co.,
41 Ariz. 31, 34, 15 P.2d 249, 251 (1932); Brown v. Hall, 221 So. 2d 454, 458 (Fla. App.
1969); Dean v. Union Nat. Fire Ins. Co., 301 So. 2d 925, 926 (La. App. 1974); Caruso v.
John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 25 N.J. Misc. 318, 320, 53 A.2d 222, 223, aff'd, 136
N.J.L. 597, 57 A.2d 359 (1947); Perfecting Serv. Co. v. Product Dev. & Sales Co., 261
N.C. 660, 669, 136 S.E.2d 56, 63 (1964); Chappell v. Boram, 159 Mo. App. 442, 447, 141
S.W. 19, 20 (1911); F.M. Sibley Lumber Co. v. Schultz, 297 Mich. 206, 216, 297 N.W.
243, 246 (1941). Cf. O'Brien v. Comstock Foods, Inc., 125 Vt. 158, 160, 212 A.2d 69, 70
(1965).55 The word "contingency" seems applicable to both insurance and warranties to
describe that happening or occurrence which triggers the contractual obligation of the
promisor to the promisee. With insurance, the meaning of "contingency" is very much
bound up with the concept of risk, which one text has spoken of as the "possibility of
loss," referring to financial loss as "a decline in or disappearance of value due to a
contingency." C. ELLioTT & E. VAUGHAN, FUNDABMNTALS OF E.isx AND INSURANCE
12 (1972).
This sense of the word "risk" as used in insurance is, of course, simplified. Nonetheless,
even if one argues that the word "contingency" in insurance is understandable only with
the concept of risk in mind, a clear differentiation of "contingency" as used in insurance
from "contingency" as it can be used with warranties is not achieved. For clearly, a
warranty protects against the possibility of loss and, in particular, the possibility of
financial loss. This much is evident from the standard measure of damages for breach
of warranty: the difference between the value of the property with its warranty breached
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of which are not subject to insurance regulation."' Since the Uniform
Commercial Code imposes warranties only upon the sellers of goods,5"
and since Guaranteed Warranty did not sell the televisions it war-
ranted, the court reasoned that "a true warranty contract does not
exist. Guaranteed Warranty is neither the manufacturer nor the seller
of the television sets or picture tubes." '59
This approach is troublesome. On the one hand, the court appar-
ently assumes that a manufacturer's warranty is not properly subject
to regulation. Nevertheless, its language implies that a manufacturer is
not a seller within the meaning of the Uniform Commercial Code."0
On this assumption, the court would have to conclude that a manu-
facturer should be regulated as an insurer. The court therefore offers
no basis upon which to distinguish a manufacturer's warranty from
an insurance policy.
and the value of the property if the warranty had not been breached. A warranty has,
in other words, the same function as property insurance: to prevent the promisee from
suffering financial loss or a disappearance of value on his property due to the occurrence
of a contingency.
5 7 That warranties under the Uniform Commercial Code are not subject to regulation
as insurance would seem to be self-evident. If such warranties were subject to regulation,
retailer sellers giving warranties of merchantability or fitness for a particular pupose
would be insurers. Not only is it questionable whether any state would have the power,
even under a liberal interpretation of its insurance code, to treat such sellers as insurers,
it is also clear that regulating the Code's warranties as insurance is unnecessary since
most sellers under the Code do not present to the public those evils which insurance
regulation is intended to eliminate.
BBSee note 7 supra & text accompanying.
The court also cited the following definition of "warranty":
A warranty is a statement or representation made by the seler of goods con-
temporaneously with, and as part of, the contract of sale, although collateral to
the express object of it, having reference to the character, quality, or title of
the goods, and by which he promises or undertakes to insure that certain
facts are or shall be as he then represents them. ...
See Herndon v. Southern Pest Control Co., 307 F.2d 753, 755 (4th Cir. 1962); Bell v.
Menzies, 110 Ga. App. 436, 437, 138 S.E.2d 731, 732 (1964); Broer v. Dr. Fenton's
Vigortone Co., 231 Iowa 1276, 1278, 4 N.W.2d 416, 417 (1942); Mitchell v. Rudasill,
332 S.W.2d 91, 95 (Mo. App. 1960).
The same criticisms of the dzflnitional approach in general and the Guaranteed War-
ranty court's use of the Code's seller standard as a regulatory guide are applicable to
this definition of "warranty."
59 23 Ariz. App. 327, 330, 533 P.2d 87, 90 (1975).6 0 The assumption that a manufacturer is not a seller within the meaning of the
Code is, for many purposes, indefensible. If a manufacturer sells directly to the consumer,
he has the status of a seller under the Code. Furthermore, since "under . .. the Uniform
Commercial Code, the same warranties are implied as to both the manufacturer and re-
tailer," the manufacturer is often a seller thereunder. 2 FRU=R & FRIEMAsr, PRooucrs
Lnrrry, § 19.01(1) (1975).This does not mean, of course, that in every case both the retailer and manu-
facturer will have made the same warranties. Assuming that the same law applies
. .., the warranty of merchantability should be the same. However, the retailer
may make an express warranty or a warranty of fitness for a special purpose may
be implied, by reason of the dealings between the retailer and the purchaser,
which is not binding upon the manufacturer. Conversely, e.g., the manufacturer
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The major difficulty with the court's attempt to distinguish an
insurer from a warrantor through resort to the Uniform Commercial
Code's "seller" standard is that such an approach is as analytically
useless as a definition: it takes no account of the policies underlying
insurance regulation. It is, moreover, questionable whether the Uni-
form Commercial Code should be taken as the exclusive authority in
deciding whether a legitimate warranty exists. The draftsmen of the
Code virtually concede as much when they note that the Code's sections
on sales were not designed to disturb case law recognizing that war-
ranties need not be confined either to sales contracts or the parties
privy to such a contract.6
In short, contrary to the holding in Guaranteed Warranty, the
legitimacy of a warranty should not depend on the party who gives
it. To hold that only a seller may give a warranty discourages new
sources of warranty protection. Such a restriction conflicts with the
best interests of the consumer, for it does not stimulate product differ-
entiations in the market for warranty protection offered on products.
Furthermore, like a definitional approach, it disables the courts from
addressing the policies which are properly relevant to the decision
whether to impose insurance regulation.
CONCLUSION
Neither the Uniform Commercial Code nor a definition of insur-
ance furnishes the most satisfactory guide to deciding whether a busi-
ness activity constitutes the sale of insurance under state law. The best
approach to the problem is policy-oriented. This approach considers
the possibility of injury to the public from overreaching, fraud, unfair
marketing practices, insurer incompetence or insolvency, consumer ex-
ploitation, and so on. Consideration of these factors allows a court to
make a principled distinction between warranties and insurance. If a
warrantor does not present the public with those evils which insurance
regulatory statutes are designed to eliminate, then it should not be
regulated even though its business satisfies some definition of insur-
ance. The courts should recognize that imposing a whole body of in-
surance regulation in marginal cases such as Guaranteed Warranty
may frustrate the growth of socially desirable industries with no
apparent compensating social gain.
DOYAL MCLEmORE, JR.
may make an express warranty by advertising which is not necessarily binding
upon the retailer.
2 FRuMER & FRIEDMAN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY, § 19.01(1) n. 2.3 (1975).
611 R. ANDERSON, UNrFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 478 (2d ed. 1970).
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